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Abstract
The OSPF routing protocol is currently the predominant IGP in use on the
fixed Internet of today. This routing protocol scales “world wide”, under the
assumptions of links being relatively stable, network density being rather low
(relatively few adjacencies per router) and mobility being present at the edges
of the networks only. Recently, work has begun towards extending the domain
of OSPF to also include ad-hoc networks – i.e. dense networks, in which links
are short-lived and most nodes are mobile.
In this paper, we focus on the convergence of the Internet and ad-hoc net-
works, through extensions to the OSPF routing protocol. Based on WOSPF, a
merger of the ad-hoc routing protocol OLSR and OSPF, we examine the feature
of OSPF database exchange and reliable synchronisation in the context of ad-
hoc networking. We find that the mechanisms, in the form present in OSPF, are
not suitable for the ad-hoc domain. We propose an alternative mechanism for
link-state database exchanges in wireless ad-hoc networks, aiming at furthering
an adaptation of OSPF to be useful also on ad-hoc networks, and evaluate our
alternative against the mechanism found in OSPF.
Our proposed mechanism is specified with the following applications in mind: (i)
Reliable diffusion of link-state information replacing OSPF acknowledgements
with a mechanism suitable for mobile wireless networks; (ii) Reduced overhead
for performing OSPF style database exchanges in a mobile wireless network; (iii)
Reduced initialisation time when new nodes are emerging in the network; (iv)
Reduced overhead and reduced convergence time when several wireless OSPF
ad hoc network clouds merge.
Chapter 1
.
1.1 Introduction
Wireless ad-hoc networks are characterised by being networks of autonomous
and mobile nodes, communicating over a wireless medium whereby they form an
arbitrary, dynamic and random graph of wireless links. When the network size
grows to the point where direct links do no longer exist between all node-pairs,
ensuring connectivity in such a network becomes the task of routing. Routing in
wireless ad-hoc networks brings a host of challenges not present in traditional
wired networks, including “hidden nodes”, low and commonly shared band-
width, limited resources in the nodes (processing- and battery-power), a high
degree of network dynamics etc.
The possible use of OSPF [2] as a routing protocol in such wireless ad hoc
networks has lately been the subject of several different efforts. OLSR [4], a
link-state protocol developed within the IETF specifically for routing in wire-
less ad-hoc networks, is in its essential functioning very close to that of OSPF,
yet is without several key features of OSPF – notably the ability to perform
routing in a heterogeneous environment such as wired and wireless ad-hoc rout-
ing.
There is indeed a need for a generic wired/wireless IP routing solution. Due to
its widespread use on wired networks, as well as its likeness to OLSR, OSPF
seems like a designated candidate. However, OSPF in its basic form is not at all
tailored for mobile wireless environments and features several problems when
run in these [6] [7].
A solution for making OSPF operate efficiently on wireless ad hoc networks
is Wireless-OSPF (WOSPF), proposed in [1], where a new type of OSPF in-
terface is specifically defined for manet interfaces. This interface type operates
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through employing the ad-hoc network specific optimisations of OLSR (i.e. peri-
odic unreliable message transmission and optimised flooding through multipoint
relays [8]) while maintaining OSPF messages (i.e. Link-State Advertisements -
LSA) for diffusing topological information. However [1] proposes only a partial
adaptation of OSPF for wireless ad-hoc networks: adjacencies are not formed on
wireless ad-hoc network interfaces, which implies that the usual OSPF database
exchange and reliable synchronisation mechanisms are not in action on these in-
terfaces.
The idea behind the periodic unreliable flooding of topology information is,
that since the topology of the network is thought to be changing frequently,
LSAs (in OSPF) and TCs (similar messages in OLSR, called Topology Control
messages) are transmitted periodically and frequently to reflect these changes.
Consequently, loss of a single LSA or TC is relatively unimportant since the
information contained within the message will be repeated shortly. This ap-
proach may not work well if LSA or TC periods are not roughly homogeneous
and short: in a heterogeneous wired/wireless network, the LSAs generated by
usual wired nodes running OSPF will have long periods (up to 1 hour) while
LSAs generated by wireless nodes (running WOSPF) will typically have a pe-
riod of (often much) less than a minute. In this case, of course, the short period
argument fails, at least for the LSAs with a long period, and there is a definite
need for a mechanism to device mechanisms for conducting the usual OSPF
database exchange and reliable synchronisation in a wireless ad-hoc network.
In this paper we propose a mechanism, adapted for the low-bandwidth high-
dynamics conditions of wireless ad-hoc networks, for conducting efficient database
synchronisation in WOSPF. We qualify the performance of the proposed mech-
anism and compared to the performance of the original mechanism of OSPF.
We furthermore discuss a selection of applicability scenarios for the mechanism,
including reliable diffusion of link-state information through, reduced overhead
for performing OSPF-style database exchanges in a wireless ad-hoc network,
reduced initialisation time when new nodes are emerging in the network and
reduced overhead and reduced convergence time when several network clouds
merge.
1.1.1 Outline
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in section 1.2, a brief de-
scription of the usual OSPF database exchange and reliable synchronisation
mechanisms is reviewed, and briefly discussed in the context of wireless ad-hoc
networks.
Following, section 1.3 describes a mechanism for conducting database exchange
and reliable synchronisation, specifically adapted to, and described in the con-
text of, WOSPF [1]. This mechanism respects the fact that not all LSA’s carry
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information which is long-lived enough to justify the efforts of maintaining con-
sistency, while it still provides an efficient mechanism for allowing nodes to
maintain consistency when needed.
Section 1.4 evaluates the performance of the proposed signature exchange mech-
anism in comparison with the performance of the native OSPF signature ex-
change mechanism. Following, section 1.5 discusses the applicability of the
proposed database exchange mechanism, and section 1.6 concludes this paper.
1.2 Database Exchange in OSPF
The objective of the OSPF routing protocol is to provide, in each node, suffi-
cient topological information about the network to be able to compute (using
some metric) a suitable path between any source and destination in the network.
OSPF [2] employs two independent mechanisms for maintaining globally con-
sistent topology information in the node: (i) reliable transport of LSA messages
and (ii) database exchanges between pairs of routers.
1.2.1 Reliable Transmission
OSPF employs positive acknowledgements (ACK) on delivery with retransmis-
sions. I.e. an ACK is a retransmission repressing message. In mostly static
point-to-point-like network topologies (e.g. fixed wired networks), ACKs and
retransmissions occur over a single link in the network. More importantly, an
ACK transmitted by the recipient of an LSA message will be received by a node
which is directly able to interpret the ACK message. I.e., the recipient of an
ACK will be the node which sent the LSA to which the ACK corresponds.
In wireless ad-hoc networks, the network topology may be assumed to be chang-
ing frequently (node mobility). Interfaces are typically wireless (hence subject
to fading), of broadcast nature. Any transmission may thus interfere with all
the neighbours of the node originating the transmission. An ACK, which can
be interpreted by the node which relayed the to the ACK corresponding LSA,
will thus be interfering with all the nodes in the neighbourhood. If, due to node
mobility or fading radio links, a node does not receive an expected ACK, un-
necessary retransmissions will occur, consuming precious bandwidth. In other
words, reliable topology information diffusion through ACK’s imposes the as-
sumption that the network conditions are such that an ACK that is sent can be
received by the intended node. This does not hold for a wireless ad-hoc network,
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where the network may be substantially more dynamic: nodes may move out of
range etc.
1.2.2 Database Exchange
OSPF database exchanges are intended to synchronise the link-state database
between routers. In OSPF, database description packets are exchanged between
two nodes through one node (the master) polling an other node (the slave). Both
polls and responses have the form of database description packets containing a
set of complete LSA headers, describing (a partial set of) the respective link-
state databases of each of the two nodes. These database description packets
are used by the nodes to compare their link-state databases. If any of the two
nodes involved in the exchange detects it has out-of-date or missing information,
it issues link-state request packets to request the pieces of information from the
other node, which would update its link-state database.
In the context of wireless ad-hoc networks, wireless broadcast interfaces and a
higher degree of node mobility are typically assumed. Therefore, inconsistencies
between the link-state databases of the nodes in the network may occur more
frequently, calling for more frequent database exchanges. Moreover, the broad-
cast nature of the network interfaces implies that the bandwidth in a region
is shared among the nodes in that region and thus less bandwidth is available
between any pair of nodes to conduct the database exchange.
1.3 Database Signature Exchange
In this section, we propose a mechanism for database exchange and reliable
synchronisation, adapted to wireless ad-hoc networks. Specifically, we propose
an extension to WOSPF.
The basic idea is to employ an exchange of compact ”signatures” (hashing of
the link state database) between neighbour nodes, in order to detect differences
in the nodes’ link state databases. When a discrepancy is detected, the bits
of information required to synchronise the link state databases of the involved
nodes are then identified and exchanged. The purpose of the exchange is to
provide the nodes with a consistent view of the network topology – the task is
doing so in an efficient way.
Our approach is somewhat inspired by IS-IS [3], in which packets which list
the most recent sequence number of one or more LSAs (Sequence Numbers
4
packets) are used to ensure that neighbouring nodes agree on the most recent
link state information. I.e., rather than transmitting complete LSA headers (as
in OSPF), a more compact representation for database description messages is
employed. Also, Sequence Numbers packets accomplish a function, similar to
conventional acknowledgement packets.
The method proposed in this paper differs from the mechanism employed in
IS-IS by the use of age. For example, it may be considered a waste of resources
to check for databases consistency for LSAs issued from within a very dynamic
part of a wireless ad-hoc network (e.g. RFID tags on products in a plant): LSAs
from nodes within this domain should transmitted frequently and periodically,
thus information describing these nodes is frequently updated and “with a small
age”. LSAs from a less mobile part of the wireless ad-hoc network (e.g. sensors
on semi-permanent installations in the plant) might be updated less frequently.
Thus consistency of the corresponding entries in the link-state databases should
be ensured.
The following subsections outline how database signatures are generated,
exchanged, interpreted and used for correcting discrepancies.
1.3.1 Definition of Link State Database Signatures
We define a signature message as a tuple of the following form:
Signature Message = (Age Interval, Key,
Prefix Signature),
A signature features a set of prefix signatures:
Prefix Signature = (Prefix, Sign(Prefix)).
Each Sign(Prefix) results from hashing functions computed on the piece of
the link state database matching the specified prefix, and represents this part
of the database in the signature message.
More specifically, each Sign(Prefix) has the following structure:
Sign(Prefix) = (Primary Partial Signature,
Secondary Partial Signature,
T imed Partial Signature,
#LSA, T imed #LSA).
A primary partial signature (PPS) for a prefix is computed as a sum over all
LSAs in a nodes link-state database, where the prefix matches the advertising
5
router of the LSA:
PPS =
∑
prefixes (Hash(LSA− identifier)),
∑
prefixes denotes the sum over prefixes matching the advertising router of
the LSA. The secondary partial signature (SPS) for a prefix is computed as a
sum over all LSAs in a nodes link-state database, where the prefix matches the
advertising router of the LSA:
SPS =
∑
prefixes(Hash(LSA− identifier))·key,∑
prefixes denotes the sum over prefixes matching the advertising router of the
LSA. The timed partial signature (or TPS) for a prefix and an age interval is
computed over LSAs in a nodes link-state database where:
• the prefix matches the advertising router of the LSA,
• the age falls within the age interval of the advertisement,
and has the following expression:
TPS =
∑
prefixes,time (Hash(LSA− identifier)),
with
∑
prefixes,time denoting the sum over prefixes matching the advertising
router of the LSA and where the age falls within the age interval of the adver-
tisement. The LSA identifier is the string, obtained through concatenating the
following LSA header fields:
• LS type
• LS ID
• Advertising router
• LSA sequence number
1.3.2 Signature Exchange
Signatures are exchanged between nodes in two forms: informational signatures,
broadcast periodically to all neighbour nodes, and database exchange signatures,
employed when a node requests a database exchange with one of its neighbours.
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Informational Signature Exchange – Each node periodically broadcasts
informational (info) signatures, as well as receives signatures from its neighbour
nodes. This exchange allows nodes to detect any discrepancies between their
respective link-state databases. Section 1.3.3 details how info signatures are
generated; section 1.3.4 details how signatures are employed to detect link-state
database discrepancies.
Database Signature Exchange – Database exchange (dbx) signatures are
directed towards a single neighbour only. The purpose of emitting a dbx signa-
ture is to initiate an exchange of database information with a specific neighbour
node.
When a node detects a discrepancy between its own link-state database and
the link-state database of one of its neighbours, a database exchange is desired.
The node, detecting the discrepancy, generates a dbx signature, requesting a
database exchange to take place. In OSPF terms, the node requesting the
database exchange is the ”master” while the node selected for receiving the dbx
signature is the “slave” of that exchange. The dbx signature is transmitted with
the destination address of one node among the discrepant neighbours. The node
builds a dbx message signature, based on the information acquired from the info
signature exchange.
1.3.3 Signature message generation
This section details how info and dbx signature messages are generated.
Info Signature Generation – An info signature message describes the com-
plete link state database of the node that sends it. Absence of information
in a signature indicates absence of information in the sending nodes link state
database – in other words, if no information is given within an informational
signature about a specific prefix, it is implicitly to be understood that the send-
ing node has received no LSAs corresponding to that prefix.
The set of prefix signatures in an informative signature message can be gen-
erated with the following splitting algorithm, where the length L of the info
signature (the number of prefix signatures in the message) can be chosen at will.
We define the weight of a given prefix as the function:
Weight(prefix) = # of LSAs whose
originator matches
the prefix.
And similarly, the timed weight as the function:
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Timed Weight(prefix) = # of LSAs whose
originator matches
the prefix and
whose age falls
inside the age
interval.
Then, starting with the set of prefix signatures equal to (0, signature(0)), re-
cursively do the following.
As long as:
|set of prefix signatures| < L
1. Find in the set of prefix signatures the prefix with largest timed weight,
let it be called mprefix.
2. Replace the single (mprefix, signature(mprefix)) by the pair (mprefix0, signature(mprefix0)),
(mprefix1, signature(mprefix1)).
3. If one of the expanded prefix of mprefix has weight equal to 0, then
remove the corresponding tuple.
Dbx Signature Generation – Dbx signatures serve to trigger an exchange of
discrepant LSAs with one neighbour, known to have more up-to-date link-state
information – the ideal is to pick the neighbour which has the “most complete”
link-state database and which at the same time is going to remain a neighbour
for a sufficient period of time. In WOSPF, database exchanges are to be con-
ducted in preference with nodes selected as MPR.
The set of prefix signatures in a database exchange signature message can be
generated with the following algorithm, where the length L of the dbx signature
(the number of prefix signatures in the message) can be chosen at will.
1. Start with the same set of prefix signatures as one of the received info
signature where the discrepancies were noticed.
2. Remove from that set all the prefix signatures such that signature(prefix)
is not discrepant (with the LSA database). Use the same age interval and
key used in the received info signature. Then use the recursive algorithm
described above for info signatures, skipping step 3.
8
Indeed, contrary to info signature messages, the prefixes with zero weight are
not removed here, since the signature is not complete, i.e. the signature might
not describe the whole database. Therefore a prefix with empty weight may be
an indication of missing LSAs.
1.3.4 Checking Signatures
Upon receiving a signature message from a neighbour, a node can check its
local LSA database and determine if it differs with the neighbour’s database.
For this purpose, it computes its own prefix signatures locally using the same
prefixes, time interval and key specified in the received signature message. A
prefix signature differs with the local prefix signature when any of the following
conditions occurs:
1. both the number of LSAs and the timed number of LSAs differ;
2. both the timed partial signatures and the (primary partial signature, sec-
ondary partial signature) tuples differ.
The use of a secondary signature based on a random key is a way to cope with
the infrequent, but still possible, situations when the primary signatures agree
although the databases differ. In this case, it can be assumed that using a ran-
dom key renders the probability that both primary and secondary signatures
agree while databases are different, to be very small.
1.3.5 Database Exchange
When a node receives a dbx signature with its own ID in the destination field,
the node has been identified as the slave for a database exchange. The task
is, then, to ensure that information is exchanged to remove the discrepancies
between the link-state databases of the master and the slave.
Thus, the slave must identify which LSA messages it must retransmit, in order
to bring the information in the master up-to-date. The slave must then proceed
to rebroadcast those LSA messages.
More precisely, the slave rebroadcasts the LSA messages which match the fol-
lowing criteria:
• the age belongs to the age interval indicated in the dbx signature, AND
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• the prefix corresponds to a signed prefix in the dbx signature, where the
signature generated by the master differs from the signature as calculated
within the slave for the same segment of the link-state database.
When a node is triggered to perform a database exchange it generates a new
LSF with TTL equal to 1 (one hop only) and fills it with the update LSAs.
These LSAs must indicate the age featured at the moment in the database,
from which they are taken.
Optionally, the host can use a new type of LSF (denoted an LSF-D) which,
contrary to the one hop LSF described above, is retransmitted as a normal LSF
making use of MPRs. An LSF-D is transmitted with TTL equal to infinity.
Upon receiving of such a packet, successive nodes remove from the LSF-D the
LSAs already present in their database before retransmitting the LSF-D. If the
LSF-D is empty after such a processing, a node will simply not retransmit the
LSF-D. The use of LSF-D packets is more efficient for fast wide-area database
updates in case of merging of two independent wireless networks.
1.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section we compare the performance of database signature exchange pro-
tocol with the full database exchange of OSPF. In this first analysis we consider
the “cost” of the protocol when two databases differ on a single record. While
this is a special case, it gives a good idea of what kind of performance gains we
can get.
We denote by n the number of records in the database (typically n can range
from a few tens to a thousand) and by Q the number of aggregated signatures
contained in a signature message (typically Q = 10). Quantity b denotes the
maximal size of the portion of database a node will transmit as a whole (i.e.
without signature exchanges). To simplify we assume that a signature and a
record exchange yields the same cost. Let this cost be the unit.
1.4.1 Retrieving a single mismatch
Let Dn being the average cost of database retrieval when the mismatch occurs
on a random record among n. Let Sn be the average retrieval costs summed on
all possible location of the mismatch in the database. Typically Sn = nDn.
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Theorem 1 The average recovery cost of a single mismatch is:
Dn =
1
logQ
((Q+ 1− 1
Q
) log n
+(Q+ 1− 1
Q
Hb−1 +
Q− 1
Q2
b)
+P (log n) +O(
1
n
),
where Hk =
∑
i = 1k 1i denotes the harmonic sum, and P (x) is a periodic func-
tion of period logQ with very small amplitude.
Proof – When n ≤ b, then Dn = n and Sn = n2, since the database is ex-
changed as a whole in this case.
When n > b, elementary algebra on random partitions yields:
Sn = nQ+
∑
n1+···+nQ=n
Q−n
(
n
n1 · · ·nQ
)
(Sn1 + · · ·SnQ).
Denoting S(z) =
∑
n Sn
zn
n! e
−z the so-called Poisson generating function of Sn,
we get the functional equation:
S(z) = QS(
z
Q
) +Qz − ((Q+ 1− 1
Q
)zeb(z)
+
(Q− 1)
Q2
z2eb−1(z))e−z
with the convention that ek(z) =
∑
i≤k
zi
i! . Let D(z) = S(z)/z. We therefore
have the functional equation:
D(z) = D(
z
Q
) +Q− ((Q+ 1− 1
Q
)eb(z)
+
(Q− 1)
Q2
zeb−1(z))e−z
Using the Mellin transformation D∗(s) =
∫∞
0
D(x)xs−1dx, defined for <(s) ∈
]− 1, 0[, and using the fact that the Mellin transformation of D( zQ ) is QsD∗(s),
we get to the closed form solution:
D∗(s) =
Γb(s)(Q+ 1− 1/Q) + Γb−1(s+ 1)(Q− 1)/Q
1−Qs
with the convention that Γk(s) is the Mellin transformation of eb(z)e
−z. We
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note by the way that, Γk(s) =
∑
i≤k
Γ(s+i
i! .
The reverse Mellin transformation then yields:
D(x) = 12ipi
∫ c+i∞
c−i∞ D
∗(s) exp(s log x)ds for any c such that <(c) ∈]−1, 0[. When
the integration path moves to the right, it encounters a succession of singulari-
ties on the vertical axis <(s) = 0. There is a double pole on s = 0 and there are
single poles on sk =
2ikpi
logQ for k being integer. Therefore, by virtue of singularity
analysis, we have for any m:
D(x) = −µ0 log x− λ0
−
∑
k
λk exp(−2ikpi log x
logQ
)
+O(
1
xm
),
where λ0 and µ0 are, respectively, the first and second order residus of D
∗(s) at
s = 0, where and λk is the first order residus at s = sk. Identifying residus is a
trivial matter. Notice that P (x) = −∑k λk exp(−2ikpi log xlogQ ), which is periodic
of period logQ. The estimate is true for every m, since there are no more sin-
gularities in the right half plan.
We use the depoissonization theorem to assess that Sn = nDn = nD(n) +O(1)
when n→∞, which terminates the proof of the theorem.
Figure 1.1 shows the asymptotic behaviour of retrieval cost with Q = b = 16 for
n varying from 100 to 1,000. It is compared with full database retrieval cost.
Figure 1.1: Signature retrieval cost (bottom) compared with full database re-
trieval cost (top) with a single record mismatch versus database size: Q = 16,
b = 16
12
1.5 Applicability of the Database Signature Ex-
change Mechanism
This section outlines the applicability of the specified mechanisms in a set of
common scenarios. One application has been discussed previously: ensuring
that information from LSA messages, originating from attached wired networks
with potentially long intervals between LSA message generation, is maintained
in all nodes in the wireless ad-hoc network. The scenarios outlined in this sec-
tion go beyond that situation, and consider how the database signature exchange
may apply even in pure wireless scenarios.
1.5.1 Emerging Node
When a new node emerges in an existing network, the initialisation time for
that node is the time until it has acquired link-state information, allowing it
to participate fully in the network. Ordinarily, this time is determined solely
by the frequency of control traffic transmissions. In order to reduce the initial-
isation time, the database exchange mechanisms can be employed as soon as
the node has established a relationship with one neighbour node already ini-
tialised. This emerging node will select a neighbour as slave and transmit a
dbx signature of the form ([age min, age max],(*,signature(*)), ”*” implying an
empty prefix. The slave will respond by, effectively, offering its entire link-state
database to the master. In particular in situations where the some LSAs are not
transmitted frequently (outside LSAs would be an example of such), this mech-
anism may drastically reduce the initialisation time of new nodes in the network.
1.5.2 Merging Wireless Clouds
Two disjoint sets of nodes, employing [1] as their routing protocol, may at some
point merge or join – i.e. that a direct (radio) link is established. Prior to the
merger, the respective clouds are ”stable”, periodically transmitting consistent
info signatures within their respective networks. At the point of merger, at least
two nodes, one from each network, will be able to establish a direct link and
exchange control traffic. The combined network is now in an unstable state,
with great discrepancies between the link-state databases of the nodes in the
formerly two networks. Employing signature and database exchanges through
the LSF-D mechanism, the convergence time until a new stable state is achieved
can be kept at a minimum.
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1.5.3 Reliable Flooding
If a node wants a specific LSA to be reliably transmitted to its neighbour, the
db signature mechanism can be employed outside of general periodic signature
consistency check. The node transmitting the LSA message broadcasts an info
signature, containing the full LSA-originator ID as signed prefix and a very
narrow age interval, cantered on the age of the LSA which is to be reliably
transmitted. A neighbour which does not have the LSA in its database will
therefore automatically trigger a database exchange concerning this LSA and
send a dbx signature containing the LSA-originator ID signed with an empty
signature. The receiving of such a dbx signature will trigger the first node to
retransmit the LSA right away with a new LSF to ensure that the LSA does
get through.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the notion of database exchange and reliable
synchronisation in the context of wireless ad-hoc networks. Inspired by the
mechanisms from the routing protocol OSPF, we have argued that in the form,
present in OSPF, these mechanisms are not suitable for the wireless ad-hoc do-
main. While OSPF is designed for relatively static networks, the potentially
very dynamic nature of wireless ad-hoc networks imply that database incon-
sistencies may arise more frequently with less available network capacity for
alleviating the inconsistencies – and that acknowledgement-based reliability is
unsuitable since the correct interpretation of an acknowledgement depends on
being received in a specific context.
Consequently, we have deviced an mechanism for database exchange, adapted
for the the specific environment of wireless ad-hoc networks. The mechanism is
proposed as an extension to the OSPF interface type WOSPF [1]. The mecha-
nism allows an efficient way of detecting and alleviating database inconsistencies,
and can furthermore be employed as a way of providing “context-independent
selective acknowledgements” for reliable synchronisation and link-state diffu-
sion.
We have, analytically, compared the performance of our proposed mechanism to
the performance of the mechanisms for database exchange in OSPF, and found
it to be superior in terms overhead. We have furthermore outlined a couple of
scenarios, where application of the mechanisms deviced in this paper may be
advantageous for a wireless ad-hoc network.
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Ongoing and future work on this topic involves extending the analytical perfor-
mance evaluation of this mechanism, as well as conducting exhaustive simula-
tions and experimental testing, comparing the performance of WOSPF with or
without database exchange and reliable synchronisation mechanisms.
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Packet Formats
Info and dbx signatures share the same packet format, detailed in this section.
Signature Packet Format
|                                                               |
|                            (etc.)                             |
 0             1               2               3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
|   Version #   |       8       |         Packet length         |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|                            Router ID                          |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|                             Area ID                           |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|            Checksum           |             AuType            |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|                         Authentication                        |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|                         Authentication                        |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|      Type     |   Reserved    |    Secondary signature key    |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|                          Destination                          |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|                                                               |
|                        Prefix Signature                       |
|                                                               |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|                                                               |
|                        Prefix Signature                       |
|                                                               |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|             AgeMin            |             AgeMax            |
Version #, Packet length, Router ID, Area ID, Checksum, AuType and Au-
thentication fields are the OSPF control packet header as described in [2].
AgeMin, AgeMax
AgeMin and AgeMax defines the age interval [AgeMin,AgeMax], used for
computing the timed partial signatures in the prefix signatures as de-
scribed in section 1.3.3.
Type
Specifies if the signature is an info or a dbx signature, according to the
following:
Value Type
1 info (informative)
2 dbx (database exchange)
Reserved
Must be set to ”00000000” for compliance with this specification.
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Secondary signature key
The key of the secondary signature is a random number of 32 bits. Used
for computing the secondary partial signature as described in section 1.3.1.
Destination
- If the signature is of type = 2, then this field contains the address
of the slave, with which a database exchange is requested.
- If the signature is of type = 1, then this field must be zeroed.
Prefix signature
The set of prefixes signatures contains the sub-signatures for different parts
of the link-state database. The layout of the prefix signatures is detailed
in section 1.3.3.
Prefix Signature Format
 0             1               2               3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|                      Prefix identifier                        |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|   Reserved    | Prefix length |           # of LSAs           |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|   Primary partial signature   |   Secondary parial signature  |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
|        Timed # of LSAs        |    Timed partial signature    |
+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+−+
Prefix identifier and Prefix length
Indicates the length of the prefix for the part of the link-state database,
as well as the exact prefix.
# of LSAs
The number of LSAs in the emitting nodes link-state database, matching
by the prefix identifier and prefix length.
Primary partial signature
The arithmetic sum of the hashing of each string made of the concate-
nation of sequence number and LSA-originator ID fields of the tuples
(LSA-originator ID, LSAsequence-number, LSA-age) from the emitting
nodes link-state database such that the LSA-originator ID and prefix ID
has same prefix of length prefix-length.
Secondary partial signature
The arithmetic sum of the XOR between the secondary signature key
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and each of the hashing of each string made of the concatenation of se-
quence number and LSA-originator ID fields of the tuples (LSA-originator
ID, LSAsequence-number, LSA-age) from the emitting nodes link-state
database such that the LSA-originator ID and prefix ID has same prefix
of length prefix-length.
Timed # of LSAs
The number of LSAs in the emitting nodes link-state database, matching
by the prefix identifier and prefix length and satisfying the condition that
the LSA age is between AgeMin and AgeMax.
Timed partial signature
The arithmetic sum of the hashing of each string made of the concatena-
tion of sequence number and LSA-originator ID fields of the tuples (LSA-
originator-ID,LSA sequence-number, LSA-age) from the emitting nodes
link-state database such that:
• Prefix ID and LSA-originator ID has same prefix of length prefix-
length
• LSA-age is between AgeMin and AgeMax.
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